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Abstract 
Throughout her work, Audre Lorde maintains that her self-preservation in the face of 
oppression depends on acting from the recognition and valorization of her feelings as a 
deep source of knowledge. This claim, taken as a portrayal of agency, poses challenges to 
standard positions in ethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. This article examines 
the oppositional agency articulated by Lorde’s thought, locating feeling, poetry, and the 
power she calls “the erotic” within her avowed project of self-preservation. It then explores 
the implications of taking seriously Lorde’s account, particularly for theorists examining 
ethics and epistemology under nonideal social conditions. For situations of sexual 
intimacy, for example, Lorde’s account unsettles prevailing assumptions about the role of 
consent in responsibility between sexual partners. I argue that obligations to solicit consent 
and respect refusal are not sufficient to acknowledge the value of agency in intimate 
encounters when agency is oppositional in the way Lorde describes.  
 
Keywords: agency, Audre Lorde, Black feminism, feminist ethics, sexual consent, 
sources of knowledge and justification 
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In a striking interview with fellow poet Adrienne Rich, Audre Lorde describes how being 
asked for justification of what she intuitively feels to be true is experienced as an attack, “a total 
wipeout of my modus, my way of perceiving and formulating” (Lorde 1984: 104). Rich bristles 
at this characterization, and the conversation continues: 
Adrienne: There are times when I simply cannot assume that I know what you 
know, unless you show me what you mean. [. . .] Help me to perceive what you 
perceive. That’s what I’m trying to say to you. 
Audre: But documentation does not help one perceive. At best it only analyzes 
the perception. At worst, it provides a screen by which to avoid concentrating on 
the core revelation, [to avoid] following it down to how it feels. Again, 
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knowledge and understanding. They can function in concert, but they don’t 
replace each other. [. . .] I don’t know about you, Adrienne, but I have a difficult 
enough time making my perceptions verbal, tapping that deep place, forming that 
handle, and documentation at that point is often useless. Perceptions precede 
analysis just as visions precede action or accomplishments. (Lorde 1984: 104) 
The conversation progresses with a conciliatory tone. Rich acknowledges that Lorde’s poems are 
themselves a form of documentation and that her own demand for evidence is motivated in part 
by resistance, as a white woman, to Lorde’s perceptions of the racist world they share—
resistance to the changes to her life demanded by recognizing her own complicity. 
Rich’s feeling of resistance reflects a truth about Lorde’s work: Lorde calls for her listener 
to respond, to make changes. Lorde writes about feeling, survival, solidarity, and global justice 
to pose a confrontation to others, so that her reflections and analyses may be taken up and put to 
use. Her first commitment is to aid those, like her, struggling against multiple forms of 
racialized, gendered, and sexualized oppression. But she also writes to demand something of 
those, like Rich, whose similarities to her (as women, as lesbians, or as poets) position them to 
become allies across differences of race; she demands that they not turn away from “the cold 
winds of self-scrutiny” (Lorde 1984: 132). 
What does it look like for philosophers to heed Lorde’s call for self-scrutiny, not only by 
transforming the institutional and interpersonal politics that govern the discipline, but by taking 
seriously Lorde’s insights, valuing the black feminist perspective that produces them, and 
allowing them to reshape philosophical positions and motivations? A close reading of Lorde’s 
work reveals her challenge to theorists to produce writing and thought more adequate to the 
complexities of agency, selfhood, and relationality—especially as those aspects of life are shaped 
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by oppression in its many dimensions. Yet, while her stature in social theory and cultural 
criticism continues to grow, scant attention has been paid to the implications of her work for 
ethics.1 Theorists across disciplines have drawn on Lorde to explore racialized experience, 
identity, and resistance (e.g. Ahmed 2004; Nash 2011; Keating 2013: 89–110), as well as 
solidarity and coalitional politics across difference (e.g. Ortega 2006; Havis 2014). 
Independently, Lorde has become a primary reference point for philosophical work on anger, 
especially in its political dimensions (e.g. Meyers 2004: 145–155; Tessman 2005: 116–122; 
Srinivasan 2017; Ibrahimhakkioglu 2017; Cherry 2019). Feminist thinkers have also long valued 
Lorde’s concept of the erotic, which is treated with increasing nuance in contemporary 
discussions (e.g. Acampora 2007; Willey 2016: 125–139; Musser 2018), although further 
philosophical exploration would be beneficial. Outside these projects, however, it is still too 
often the case that Lorde is quoted without context or only included in lists of black and queer 
feminist thinkers. I believe rich philosophical insights have not yet been appreciated for lack of a 
more comprehensive, contextualized understanding of Audre Lorde’s thought. 
This article is a meditation on the agency that Lorde describes as supporting her considered 
actions and on how philosophical approaches to ethics might learn from it, especially how it 
might change analyses of the ethics of intimate encounters. In sections one through four, I 
examine Lorde’s descriptions of how she uses the knowledge that comes from feeling deeply to 
pursue survival. I identify five figures in her account that articulate how she develops and 
practices agency in opposition to intersecting forces of disempowerment: self-preservation, 
knowing by feeling deeply, poetry, the erotic, and not looking the other way from her 
 
1 Ginzberg (1991) is an exception. 
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experience. In the final section, I explore how attending to the validity of Lorde’s oppositional 
agency might disrupt common assumptions in moral theory. I focus on how an engagement with 
Lorde’s thought challenges the notion that sexual consent is the basic determinant of 
responsibility to a partner in a sexual encounter. Reading two vignettes from Lorde’s semi-
autobiographical writing, I argue that her encounters ought to be contextualized within her 
oppositional agency, and that this indicates that responsibility to a sexual partner can demand 
more than soliciting and respecting a partner’s consent.  
 
I. The Agency to Pursue Self-Preservation 
Audre Lorde articulates her selfhood according to dynamic identity markers—black, 
lesbian, feminist, mother, poet, cancer survivor—that each require active sustenance in a society 
invested in denying her value and undermining her agency. She writes, “I am constantly defining 
my selves, for I am, as we all are, made up of so many different parts. But when those selves war 
within me, I am immobilized, and when they move in harmony, or allowance, I am enriched, 
made strong” (2009: 156). Lorde uses the term self-preservation to refer to the project of 
developing and integrating these facets of self in the absence of hermeneutical resources or 
empowering conventions to support the human relationships she seeks. Self-preservation 
includes fostering integrity, learning to balance among the inner tensions of her multiplicitous 
identity, and resisting societal forces that threaten to impose on her a “narrow individuation of 
self” tethered to one mode of living (e.g. as black or as a lesbian) at the expense of the others. 
Specifically, Lorde seeks to resist the pitfalls of internalized racism, misogyny, and homophobia 
that block the personal and communal relationships of mutual support that she (like other black 
and queer women) needs to survive. The task of self-preservation demands active practices of 
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making sense of her life, developing her own terms to define her life projects, and creating 
relationships that go against the impoverished models made available by her society. 
While not reducible to subsistence, self-preservation can be a matter of life and death 
because, Lorde tells us, the suppression or subjugation of aspects of the self can have 
catastrophic effects. She describes in her writing how the women in her past who did not survive 
were those who were forced to neglect or deny life to a part of themselves. In her novel-memoir, 
Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (1982), she reflects: “many of us wound up dead or 
demented, and many of us were distorted by the many fronts we had to fight upon” (225). In 
three terse, heartbreaking sentences, she tells the story of Muff, another black lesbian in the 
predominantly white, 1950s New York gay scene: 
She sat on the same seat in the same dark corner of the Pony Stable Bar drinking 
the same gin year after year. One day she slipped off onto the floor and died of a 
stroke right there between the stools. We found out later her real name was 
Josephine. (178) 
In Lorde’s telling, this is Muff’s whole story: a life cornered into stagnation within a tragically 
narrow expression of selfhood, with nobody close enough to learn the aspects of that self—
including her other names, where she came from—whose expression could have brought other 
possibilities. 
The term “self-preservation” for Lorde does not connote the persistence of a static identity, 
but an active unfolding of particular aspects of her selfhood in her relationships and life 
activities. It is a dynamic process of self-making in response to external constraints; to survive, 
she writes, “for Black/Poet/Women is synonymous with grow” (Lorde 2009: 158). In a social 
environment that denies her status as a person or an agent, Lorde cannot flourish simply by 
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maintaining her standing. To fashion a fulfilling life for herself requires actively bending her 
surroundings into a shape that can support her multiple identities—“seeking a now that can breed 
futures” (Lorde 1978: 31). Self-preservation also requires finding her own epistemic resources 
for self-understanding, as I discuss in the next section. These challenges of fostering agency and 
a dynamic sense of selfhood in a hostile society are core concerns of decolonial and black 
feminist thought. As Fanon (2008) and others have argued, racialization and other forms of 
oppression obstruct the capacities to perceive, to know, and to intend that are the building blocks 
of agency. 
Because the different faces of her identity must be able to grow and change, Lorde cannot 
achieve self-preservation simply by orienting her actions toward safety or securing herself 
against possibilities of upheaval and pain in her life. To pursue security instead of self-
preservation, according to Lorde, is to dedicate oneself to a doomed project of insulating against 
the world, numbing oneself to the feelings that inexorably arise in a life where a person and her 
loved ones cannot avoid struggle. While such security is a means of subsistence, it allows an 
oppressive society to dictate one’s definitions and expressions of self, foreclosing the 
development of a mature agency of self-making. It also cuts off feelings that, as we shall see, 
may be indispensable for the development of knowledge and resistance. 
In Zami, Lorde explicitly dramatizes her commitment to self-preservation over security. 
She describes lying curled up in bed the night before her eighteenth birthday, enduring waves of 
excruciating pain as a coiled Foley catheter—that “cruel benefactor”—hardens in her uterus. 
Waiting for her body to expel the unwanted fetus inside her, she identifies her action as 
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a kind of shift from safety towards self-preservation. It was a choice of pains. 
That’s what living was all about. I clung to that and tried to feel only proud. I had 
not given in. (1982: 111) 
Lorde pursues a form of self-making in such situations that entails choosing among pains while 
simultaneously working to generate new possibilities. To make life livable—to establish “real 
resistance to the deaths we are expected to live”—is the only substantive mode of survival 
available to a person pervasively denied value and agency by default structures of her society 
(Lorde 1984: 38). 
 
II. Lorde’s Epistemic Foundations for Agency 
Across her work, Audre Lorde expresses repeatedly that the knowledge she gains from 
feeling is the key to aligning her actions toward self-preservation (e.g. 1984: 37; 2009: 149). She 
elaborates on this frame for agency in her theoretical discussions of poetry, the erotic, and the 
imperative to face feelings such as anger and fear (see ‘Poetry is Not a Luxury’, ‘Uses of the 
Erotic: The Erotic as Power’, ‘The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism’, and ‘Eye to 
Eye: Black Women, Hatred, and Anger’, collected in Lorde 1984; see also ‘Turning the Beat 
Around: Lesbian Parenting 1986’, and ‘My Words Will Be There’, collected in Lorde 2009). 
 
Feeling Deeply as a Source of Knowledge 
Patricia Hill Collins writes, “Black women’s empowerment involves rejecting the 
dimensions of knowledge that perpetuate objectification, commodification, and exploitation” in 
favor of “those dimensions of our individual, group, and formal educational ways of knowing 
that foster our humanity” (2000: 308). Because prevalent values and dominant sources of 
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knowledge at best accommodate—and at worst actively perpetuate—justifications for devaluing 
lives like hers, Lorde cannot develop possibilities for self-preservation through simply gaining 
fluency in master discourses. There are inevitably moments where societal hostilities puncture 
the privileges afforded by dominant modes of knowing—e.g. an encounter with the police, an 
attempt to report sexual assault, or an everyday case of racist exclusion from public space (see 
Williams 1991; see also Dotson 2012: 26–28; and Dotson and Gilbert 2014). Thus, Lorde must 
look elsewhere to find reliable epistemic resources—both informational and hermeneutical (see 
Fricker 2015: 76; cited in Davis 2018)—for understanding the realities of her life. 
For Lorde, feeling deeply is the source of information necessary for pursuing her project of 
self-preservation. Dedicated to reading and learning from a young age, Lorde discovered there 
were aspects of her experience—necessities imposed on her as she navigated a racist 
environment—that pointed toward truths about the world for which she found no evidence or 
explanation in the formal educational resources of books or school. She felt on a daily basis the 
effects of invisible forces shaping her possibilities, but the logic of those forces remained 
shrouded in mystery. 
Communal modes of articulating this knowledge also eluded her, as she was isolated from 
black peers, and her parents stubbornly avoided discussion of the oppressive forces affecting 
their lives. As she matured and sought to make sense of her situation, it became clearer to her 
that the conventional wisdom shared by her white peers and their parents fell short of explaining 
what she began to know, through living, to be true. With the failure of formal and communal 
explanations, Lorde turned inward to focus on her individual perception of the truths that 
governed her survival—both truths about herself and about the world. She found that feeling was 
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the dimension of her experience that attested to these truths, and she learned to pay attention to 
feeling as a way of perceiving what remained implicit in her racist and sexist surroundings. 
 
Poetry to Produce Knowledge and Understanding 
Both in Zami and in the interview with Rich, Lorde describes her organic experience of 
thought as “bubbling up” from a chaos of feeling, as lacking organization or structure to enable it 
to be crafted into something resembling analytic understanding. She says of her early adulthood, 
[thinking was a process] I had come to suspect because I had seen so many errors 
committed in its name, and I had come not to respect it. On the other hand, I was 
also afraid of it because there were inescapable conclusions or convictions I had 
come to about my own life, my own feelings, that defied thought. And I wasn’t 
going to let them go. [. . .] But I couldn’t analyze or understand them because they 
didn’t make the kind of sense I had been taught to expect through understanding. 
There were things I knew and couldn’t say. And I couldn’t understand them. 
(1984: 87–8) 
She found herself confused and alienated, not only lacking the intellectual understanding 
required to conform in school, but also lacking recognition that the knowledge she needed for 
self-preservation could be found in the insights provided by her feelings. (Notice Lorde’s 
distinction between knowledge and understanding: knowledge is perception and awareness of 
reality that one recognizes and valorizes as reasons for acting, while understanding is the 
intellectual mode of examining, analyzing, and explaining such knowledge.) Frustrated with the 
resources for understanding available to her, she learned to produce poetic images that would 
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enable her felt perceptions to develop into something that could be used and shared to motivate 
action. 
Lorde writes, “it is through poetry that we give name to those ideas which are—until the 
poem—nameless and formless, about to be birthed, but already felt” (Lorde 1984: 36). Through 
poetry, Lorde examines and valorizes as knowledge what she feels deeply, enabling her to 
express, act on, and share that knowledge with others. Prior to finding her poetic voice, she 
explains, “all I had was the sense that I had to hold on to these feelings and that I had to air them 
in some way” (1984: 88). By learning to express herself poetically, she clarifies this confused 
lifeline of feeling and molds it into something that can be more properly described as knowledge: 
When I wrote something that finally had it, I would say it aloud and it would 
come alive, become real. It would start repeating itself and I’d know, that’s 
struck, that’s true. Like a bell. Something struck true. And there the words would 
be. (88) 
She discovered poetry as a bridge between the chaotic depths of feeling and the world in which 
action and communication must take place (for discussion, see Hull 1990: 169–172). 
Thus, feeling, knowing, and understanding are the three major figures in Audre Lorde’s 
practical epistemology. Feeling is the core element—not emotions or sensations, per se, but a 
chaotic wellspring of perception, something inside whose often-obscure presence presses on her 
consciousness. According to Lorde, this deep feeling at times presents itself as confusion, but it 
can also give rise to a knowledge of who she is, of what society demands of her, and of what she 
should be unwilling to give up. This knowledge, when it can be achieved, serves as ground for 
her actions, and she attributes to it her successes at surviving and preserving her multifaceted 
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identity. Such knowing arises prior to the analytic modes of thought—e.g. logical reasoning, 
prose writing—that build an understanding that enables an idea to be manipulated and discussed. 
Epistemologists may be skeptical of this account of poetry and felt knowledge (but see 
Shotwell 2011: 24–28). Lorde departs from the view that knowledge is developed as a product of 
honing the understanding: according to Lorde’s interpretation of her experience, it is not the case 
that she reflects rationally on her feelings to gain an analytic understanding that can confer 
epistemic validity (i.e. to justify her true beliefs). Instead, her account shows the development of 
a kind of knowledge that grows directly from the feelings partially hidden in her experience. This 
knowledge to Lorde is something deeper than and prior to understanding; it is “that dark and true 
depth which understanding serves, waits upon, and makes accessible through language to 
ourselves and others” (1984: 68). If epistemologically heterodox, this theme is familiar in 
aesthetic discussions of poetry. In the words of Stanley Cavell: 
There is a natural problem of making such experiences [of inner self] known [. . .] 
because one hasn’t forms of words at one’s command to release those feelings, 
and hasn’t anyone else whose interest in helping to find the words one trusts. 
(Someone would have to have these feelings to know what I feel.) Here is a 
source of our gratitude to poetry. (2002: 245, emphasis original) 
For Audre Lorde, a deep feeling valorized through poetry as conscious knowledge can align 
actions toward self-preservation, aided by but not dependent on understanding. 
Although her account is controversial, taking seriously Lorde’s analysis of her experience 
can productively trouble assumptions about the status and origins of knowledge with respect to 
action. By locating knowledge in her deep feelings, Lorde attests that knowing is a value-laden 
practice in the context of her life—a recurring theme in black feminist thought (Collins 2000: 
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284–5). The value of her claims to knowledge emanates from a more personal source than the 
formal validity or truth value of her propositional beliefs; it comes from how what she feels to be 
true can serve her self-preservation. In other words, publicly validated modes of analysis and 
understanding are only valuable to her insofar as they expand possibilities for survival, which 
they only do when directed by her deeper sense of what is true and what is right. She makes this 
position more or less explicit in her conversation with Adrienne Rich: 
Rationality is not unnecessary. It serves the chaos of knowledge. It serves feeling. 
It serves to get from this place to that place. But if you don’t honor those places, 
then the road is meaningless. [. . .] I don’t see feel/think as a dichotomy. I see 
them as a choice of ways and combinations. (1984: 100–1) 
When deep feeling is valorized as a source of knowledge, Lorde claims, understanding becomes 
an aid to a greater vision of self-preservation, which for her is by necessity a vision of future 
possibilities that depart from present realities: “the possible shapes of what has not been before 
exist only in that back place, where we keep those unnamed, untamed longings for something 
different and beyond what is now called possible, and to which our understanding can only build 
roads” (1984: 101; see discussion in Keeling 2019: xi–xvi). However, for such longings to 
become reality, the chaotic wellspring of feeling must become clarified and raised to a form that 
enables it to motivate one’s choices of action and relationship. 
 
III. Motivating Action through the Power of the Erotic 
Because Lorde’s agency meets constant friction from her social context, she requires 
significant energy to fuel the work of grappling with feeling, expressing feeling in poetry, and 
acting on the knowledge thereby distilled. In perhaps her most widely read essay, “Uses of the 
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Erotic”, Lorde describes the erotic as the power that provides energy for self-preservation—
energy to integrate pursuits around “making our lives and the lives of our children richer and 
more possible” (1984: 55). Not necessarily sexual, the erotic becomes available when a person 
allows herself to feel deeply, and it makes possible the affirmation of those deep feelings—
through poetry in Lorde’s case, as described above—as a knowledge that she can then find ways 
of bringing to action. Describing the erotic in terms of feeling, knowledge, and understanding, 
Lorde writes obliquely: 
[feeling] is the first and most powerful guiding light toward any understanding. 
And understanding is a handmaiden which can only wait upon, or clarify, that 
knowledge, deeply born. The erotic is the nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest 
knowledge. (1984: 56) 
By nurturing her felt knowledge, the erotic enables her to “live from within outward”, mobilizing 
her perceptions to give purpose to her actions of resistance and to illuminate their impact (1984: 
58).  
Lorde’s description of the erotic contests the distinction between sex and other creative, 
intimate encounters, but she does not suggest that all intimate activities are inherently erotic. The 
erotic is not just a matter of what we do, but a qualitative way of doing these things: “a question 
of how acutely and fully we can feel in the doing” (1984: 54). This suggests, contra some 
interpretations (e.g. Ferguson 2012; Acampora 2007), that Lorde’s project is not a call for 
sexuality or desire to permeate all areas of life. Feeling is more central than desire for the erotic 
power to drive Lorde’s agency. Lorde describes how the kind of deep feeling that activates the 
erotic can take place in the private engagement of a person with her work—“dancing, building a 
bookcase, writing a poem, examining an idea”—or in a shared undertaking. Essential to the 
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erotic is opening oneself to what is felt in such practices, which enables valorizing those feelings 
as knowledge that can then organize one’s actions. 
By focusing on the erotic as a power, my interpretation differs slightly from that proffered 
by Alexis Shotwell in Knowing Otherwise (2011). Shotwell describes the erotic as an “affective 
feeling-scape with political content” (25), itself a source of implicit knowledge. She takes 
poetry’s function to be linking the erotic to “more traditional ways of knowing”, i.e. to what 
Lorde calls understanding (27). I have described above, however, how the source of knowledge 
for Lorde is feeling itself, and the function of poetry is to bring deep feeling to the surface, where 
it can be recognized as knowledge and enjoy the potential for understanding. Contra Shotwell, I 
read Lorde’s erotic as the power that accompanies feeling deeply, that can motivate both the 
poetic work of self-recognition and other actions that move out from it. (In this, my reading is 
more closely aligned with AnaLouise Keating’s (2013) analysis.) Ultimately, however, the 
ambiguities between the functions of poetry and the erotic in Lorde’s descriptions are productive 
and probably intentional; they highlight how power and perception are inseparable in the 
movement toward self-preservation through expression and action. 
“Uses of the Erotic” has given rise to a number of competing interpretations, in part 
because Lorde uses metaphor and imagery to describe the erotic without defining it. In her 
words, the erotic is a “source of power and information”, “a resource within each of us that lies 
in a deeply female and spiritual plane”, a “measure between the beginnings of our sense of self 
and the chaos of our strongest feelings”, and an “internal sense of satisfaction” (1984: 54–5). 
These varied formulations have led some (e.g. Nussbaum 1995) to interpret the erotic statically 
as a description of desire or a prescription of how sex ought to be shaped, overlooking its context 
as a key term within Lorde’s praxis of everyday self-preservation. Further, Lorde’s valorization 
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of deep feelings has raised concerns from both rationalists and poststructuralists that the erotic 
presupposes an ostensibly authentic core of self. This contributes to a sense among critics that 
the notion of the erotic is perhaps tragically optimistic: how can one know whether such feelings 
necessarily point one toward good rather than harmful actions (see, e.g. Hall 1998)? And what of 
the exclusions that may be authorized by the characterization of the erotic as lying “in a deeply 
female and spiritual plane”? The apparent problem of gender essentialism has led some feminists 
and queer theorists to criticize Lorde as an exemplar of “cultural feminism”, i.e. the movement to 
(re-)valorize the feminine or womanly traits devalued by patriarchy. 
These questions raised by Lorde’s descriptions of the erotic demand serious consideration. 
While I do not explore these challenges in detail here, I hope this essay draws attention to some 
resources internal to Lorde’s thought that can support future work in this area. Lorde’s 
commitment to the truth of deep feelings cannot be properly understood when decontextualized 
from her praxis of oppositional agency and from the teleology of self-preservation that orients 
her life. Those worried about the problem of the authenticity of feelings should also consider 
Lorde’s nuanced writings about the political and social dimensions of negative feelings and the 
work required to convert them into fuel for self-preservation, as discussed in the next section. 
For those concerned about gender essentialism, there might also be resources, as some have 
suggested, in Lorde’s notion of the self as continuously undergoing change across every 
dimension of identity (see Alcoff 1988: 412; Ginzberg 1992). 
For the purposes of this article, however, a methodological commitment persuades me to 
look beyond the controversies surrounding Lorde’s erotic. To consider sincerely Lorde’s wider 
account of oppositional knowledge developed from feeling requires that her interpretive insights 
about her life be granted provisional testimonial authority. I suggest taking Lorde at her word 
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that the power she calls the erotic is central to her own survival and self-preservation; my 
philosopher’s task is to understand more clearly how that fits into her overall agential praxis. 
 
IV. Coalitional Politics and Not Looking the Other Way from Feeling 
In the context of an inhospitable social and epistemic environment, the erotic mode of 
relating to feelings facilitates the “ability to posit, to vision” new possibilities for survival and 
self-preservation (2009: 165). Lorde writes:  
Once we recognize we can feel deeply, we can love deeply, we can feel joy, then 
we will demand that all parts of our lives produce that kind of joy. And when they 
do not, we will ask, “Why don’t they?” And it is the asking that will lead us 
inevitably toward change. (2009: 163) 
The enormous popular impact of ‘Uses of the Erotic’ among feminists—especially in the 1980s 
and 1990s—has largely resulted from this focus on women’s access to joy that has been 
suppressed by dominant, patriarchal value systems. However, on Lorde’s account, the power of 
the erotic extends beyond valorizing the knowledge that comes from positive feelings; negative 
feelings are also important resources for informing and directing action. In The Cancer Journals 
(1980), Lorde writes how the imperative to feel joy can be used to suppress actual feelings of 
pain, thereby obscuring the knowledge of feeling and closing avenues for action (Ahmed 2010: 
83; for discussion of agency in Cancer Journals, see Musser 2014: 118–150).  
Lorde articulates how oppression operates not only by imposing limits on her from outside, 
but by injecting hostility that works from within through her feelings and beliefs. She writes, “it 
is easier to deal with the external manifestations of racism and sexism than it is to deal with the 
results of those distortions internalized within our consciousness of ourselves and one another” 
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(Lorde 1984: 147). She experiences societal responses to her race, gender, and sexuality that 
vacillate between utter indifference and naked animosity, generating feelings of fear, pain, and 
anger. Lorde asserts that those feelings can either be turned into strength and power or become 
terrible weaknesses. She describes pain as “an experience that must be recognized, named, and 
then used in some way in order for the experience to change, to be transformed into something 
else, strength or knowledge or action” (1984: 171). Anger is similarly “loaded with information 
and energy” as a source of knowledge (127), but Lorde cautions how living with her anger has 
required “learning to use it before it laid my visions to waste” (124). When unrecognized and 
unacknowledged, such feelings become corrosive to her capabilities of survival and change; they 
threaten the project of self-preservation, bringing bodily and mental deterioration and the 
dissolution of relationships that could foster solidarity and empowerment (see especially “Eye to 
Eye”, in Lorde 1984). Lorde describes how accessing the erotic in deep feelings—both of joy 
and of pain—depends on the courage to not look the other way from feelings that arise in our 
actions (1984: 58–9). This is the form of attentiveness required to use the knowledge provided by 
such feelings, while avoiding being engulfed or hollowed out by them. 
While I have so far emphasized Lorde’s description of her personal sources of knowledge 
and action, self-preservation also vitally depends on communal resistance to group-based 
oppression, which requires fostering solidarity and establishing coalitions among the oppressed. 
Lorde uses the figure of not looking the other way to express opening to possibilities for such 
collaboration. In Zami, Lorde describes arriving as a young woman in Mexico City: 
I started to break my life-long habit of looking down at my feet as I walked along 
the street. There was always so much to see, and so many interesting and open 
 Ward, Caleb. “Feeling, Knowledge, Self-Preservation: Audre Lorde’s Oppositional Agency and 
Some Implications for Ethics.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (forthcoming 
2020) 
18 
faces to read, that I practiced holding my head up as I walked, and the sun felt hot 
and good on my face. (156) 
Not averting her gaze, she can see herself reflected in the “brown faces of every hue meeting 
mine”—a mode of self-recognition reinforced in the literary narrative by the sensation of warm 
sunlight (156). This theme persists in her writing on black women’s solidarity, where she focuses 
on why black women literally and figuratively look the other way from one another rather than 
engage with the pain, fear, and other feelings that arise in their encounters (1984: 145–75). 
Feelings play a central role in Lorde’s coalitional politics. She tells us, “the sharing of joy, 
whether physical, emotional, psychic, or intellectual, forms a bridge between the sharers which 
can be the basis for understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens the 
threat of their difference” (1984: 56). The ability to grapple with deep feelings and externalize 
them thus enables the kind of “complex communication” that María Lugones (2006) identifies as 
a foundation for collaboration among people for whom oppression takes different forms.2 Lorde 
writes, “I have a particular feeling, knowledge, and understanding for those sisters with whom I 
have danced hard, played, or even fought. This deep participation has often been the forerunner 
for joint concerted actions not possible before” (1984: 59). 
In summary, the erotic power of feeling deeply is the condition of possibility for an 
oppositional, felt knowledge to emerge to guide action—both personal and communal—as a 
corrective to the inadequate epistemic resources dominant in society. A person’s access to the 
erotic is constrained through oppression, which prevents recognizing the value of feelings, 
thereby limiting political capacity to enact change. The imperative not to look the other way 
 
2 Thanks to Kris Sealey for encouraging this connection. 
 Ward, Caleb. “Feeling, Knowledge, Self-Preservation: Audre Lorde’s Oppositional Agency and 
Some Implications for Ethics.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (forthcoming 
2020) 
19 
from feelings—and from the similarities and differences they make visible—is required if the 
erotic is to open oppositional modes for relationship and shared action.  
 
V. Oppositional Agency and Responsibility to an Intimate Partner 
Lorde’s conception of living according to a deeply felt knowledge is controversial for 
moral psychology from the European tradition. Her unorthodox epistemology threatens the 
authority of principle-based moral reasoning, and her teleology of living toward self-preservation 
centers a defiantly interested value over any appeal to impartiality or universal good. However, 
insofar as moral theory is invested in the value of agency and autonomy, Lorde’s oppositional 
agency poses a challenge that cannot be ignored. If agency has the shape described above for 
Audre Lorde and, perhaps, for others in similarly marginalized subject positions, then ethical 
prescriptions and moral intuitions based on the value of agency as such must be revised in 
response. 
The remainder of this article considers some implications of Lorde’s oppositional agency 
for sexual ethics, an area in which moral intuitions and ethical prescriptions have struggled to 
grasp the nonideal character of social reality (Alcoff 2018). After briefly describing how agency 
and consent have become focal points of popular and theoretical discussions of right and wrong 
in sexual encounters, I will present two examples from Lorde’s work that can perhaps show how 
her oppositional agency calls for a shift in moral intuitions that might enrich standard, consent-
based notions of responsibility to a sexual partner. 
Recent years have seen a mainstream rise in feminist-informed moral intuitions and ethico-
legal prescriptions about sexual intimacy, motivated by a basic presupposition that women ought 
to have agency over whether and how they participate in sexual encounters. This is a departure 
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from the naturalistic claims that previously guided formal adjudication of right and wrong in sex, 
which were buttressed by religious discourses, notions of property or guardianship rights, and 
sexist claims couched in the terms of sociology, psychology, and biology (Freedman 2013). 
Feminist theorists and activists have demanded that the commitment to agency be enshrined in 
consent-based legal and social standards for sexual intimacy, even as they reflexively critique 
those standards for failing to reflect and protect people’s actual agency within sexual 
encounters—especially when agency is undermined by oppression across social markers of 
gender identity, sexual orientation, class, race, citizenship or immigration status, and 
incarceration (see Alcoff 2018). 
Today, some version of the commitment to the value of sexual agency drives virtually all 
popular feminist political movements against sexual violation, and sexual consent has emerged 
as a common lever for political change across many societies. However, the specific features of 
an appropriate norm of sexual consent remain controversial—and not only to critics from the 
right. Ethical and legal theorists have for twenty-five years debated the definition, nature, and 
conditions of moral validity of consent (see Archard 2018), while feminist critical theorists have 
pointed to the potentially inadequate phenomenological and political assumptions that the norm 
of consent may entail (see, e.g. Alcoff 2018). 
As these debates continue, popular feminist discourses have reached a relative consensus 
around three consent-based obligations: to seek a partner’s agreement to any sexual behavior, to 
respect a partner’s refusal (or incapacity to agree), and to make it possible for a partner at any 
time to withdraw from or end an encounter. These obligations, discernible in most popular 
feminist discussions of sexual consent on blogs, social media, and in general-audience 
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publications, capture important aspects of women’s sexual agency, and they are probably 
necessary if not sufficient as a framework for sexual ethics. 
Working largely independently of popular feminist moral intuitions, most formal ethicists 
have come to share an adjacent position we can call the standard philosophical view of sexual 
consent: a sexual activity is morally permissible only when both people (who are competent, 
conscious, and reasonably well-informed) act intentionally (i.e. on purpose) and volitionally (i.e. 
without coercion) in a way discernable to one another as consenting to that activity (e.g. 
Wertheimer 2003). Ensuing debate among ethicists about consent typically cash out the 
appropriate parameters of coercion, sufficient information, and other limitations on the moral 
validity of consent. 
The standard philosophical view is founded on several interconnected assumptions about 
the nature of consent, with two of particular interest to those concerned with the question of 
women’s sexual agency. It assumes that (1) consent is permissive, i.e. consent’s central moral 
effect is to lift another’s obligation by making a normally prohibited act permissible; and (2) the 
moral power of consent is dependent on social norms, i.e. the moral force of an expression of 
consent requires that it follow preexisting conventions for indicating permission and for 
interpreting what is to be permitted. These assumptions are of particular concern to feminists for 
several reasons. First, they focus on local expressions of autonomy rather than on how larger 
contextual factors might be ethically relevant to sexual encounters, including how a person’s 
choice to give permission in the present might take place within a life context in which agency is 
curtailed (Alcoff 2018; West 1995). They also leave unexamined the interpersonal effects of 
power and unjust social structures on how sexual acts are proposed and by whom (Anderson 
 Ward, Caleb. “Feeling, Knowledge, Self-Preservation: Audre Lorde’s Oppositional Agency and 
Some Implications for Ethics.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (forthcoming 
2020) 
22 
2005: 108–9; Kukla 2018: 75–6). Finally, they do not address the possibility that some prevailing 
social norms surrounding sex might undermine women’s agency (e.g. Langton 1993). 
My intuition is that Audre Lorde’s thought can productively challenge the assumptions of 
the standard view and that it can do so in a way that steers philosophical consideration of sexual 
consent back toward the core feminist commitment to the importance of women’s agency. 
Without attempting to give a watertight argument for this position, I hope to show that an 
appreciation of Lorde’s feeling-based agency in her first-person accounts of sexual encounters 
can facilitate some novel insights in this direction. I proceed by relating two situations in which 
Lorde describes acting on a considered intention to have sex. In each case, her positive 
expression of that intention is taken up differently by her partner, leading to divergent outcomes. 
First, while discussing failures of black solidarity toward her as a lesbian, Lorde offers an 
anecdote: 
Like when your Black brother calls you a ball-buster and tricks you up into his 
apartment and tries to do it to you against the kitchen cabinets just, he says, to 
take you down a peg or two, when all the time you’d only gone up there to begin 
with fully intending to get a little in the first place (because all the girls I knew 
who were possibilities were too damn complicating, and I was plain and simply 
horny as hell). I finally got out of being raped although not mauled by leaving 
behind a ring and a batch of lies and it was the first time in my life since I’d left 
my parents’ house that I was in a physical situation which I couldn’t handle 
physically—in other words, the bastard was stronger than I was. (1982: 181–2) 
Here, Audre (the character) tries to act on something she feels, perhaps not so deeply: she just 
wants to “get a little”. However, as Amber Musser observes, Lorde’s sexuality requires that she 
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always “negotiate the terrain of her own desires while grappling with the contradictions within 
her subject position” (2014: 57). While a woman’s desire for casual sex with a man is usually 
culturally legible and supported by cultural norms in Lorde’s society, for Lorde to act on that 
desire while pursuing the self-preservation I have explained in section one requires a degree of 
subversion of prevailing conventions for heterosexual encounters. The man in this encounter, 
however, denies her agency to make such a solicitation while retaining self-preservation. The 
man sees Lorde, a women-oriented woman seeking to “get a little” on her own terms, as an 
affront: she is someone in need of being brought “down a peg or two”. Instead of simply 
accepting or turning down her come-on, he refuses to acknowledge the validity of her agency. 
He asserts a violent frame for their encounter that ensures that they cannot have sex in a way that 
accommodates the agency of both. Lorde suggests—both here and elsewhere—that such sexual 
violence against lesbians and other “women-identified women” in the black community is a 
result of misogynistic, homophobic conventions of heterosexuality, as well as internalized racist 
expectations of black women’s subservience (see ‘Scratching the Surface: Some Notes on 
Barriers to Women and Loving’, in Lorde 1984). 
To understand the failure of responsibility that here leads to violation, I suggest we should 
resist localizing the wrong in the moment where he does not respect her refusal, i.e. the moment 
the encounter becomes coercion and therefore nonconsensual. Rather, I propose that the origin of 
the violation is in the failure to hear or accommodate Audre’s positive agency to author her 
actions; it is a failure in his response to her initial solicitation. More than acting locally against 
her consent, the man rejects her agential possibility for consensual engagement. He fails to hear 
and respond to her expression of interest as a valid moral address, as pointing toward Audre’s 
agency and toward the value of her self-preservation. This failure suggests that sexual ethics 
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ought to consider more than whether an expression indicates a yes or a no according to its fit 
with prevailing conventions. Responsibility to a partner also entails responding to the qualitative 
features of a “yes”—not only whether it is really a yes (i.e. whether it is volitional, intentional, 
and informed), but what agency it expresses and what quality of intimacy it pursues. 
A person skeptical of using Lorde’s feelings-based epistemology for ethics might argue 
that this man also acts from feelings—perhaps feelings of fear, repulsion, or shame—and that we 
cannot claim validity for Audre’s feelings as the basis of her agency without also valorizing his 
own. However, the valorization of feeling as a source of knowledge need not be morally 
relativistic in this way. Some feelings are invested in the destruction of other people, and the 
actions that such feelings inspire can be condemned uncontroversially for the harms they cause 
to oneself and to others. According to Lorde, such feelings are usually also of minimal value as 
sources of knowledge toward self-preservation. (She discusses how hate, for example, provides 
no vision for survival; see Lorde 1984: 152.) The insight posed by Lorde’s account instead 
suggests that a certain way of feeling deeply might shed light on the prejudices of convention 
that blind people to the conditions needed for their survival. For Audre’s partner—about whom 
we can only speculate—this might require not looking the other way from the feelings that 
motivate his violence toward her. Raising those feelings to knowledge might in turn enable the 
recognition of how toxic and often racist ideals of manhood can destroy possibilities for human 
acknowledgment (see hooks 2004).  
Consider another intimate example from Zami. Narrating an encounter with a much older, 
white woman, Lorde describes a transformation of capacities. From previously being lost in her 
feeling as a child and adolescent, here Lorde begins to feel agency in self-authorship, which 
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arises from not looking the other way from her feelings and the knowledge they provide her. She 
writes: 
Night after night we had talked until dawn in this room about language and poetry 
and love and the good conduct of living. Yet we were strangers. As I stood there 
looking at Eudora, the impossible became easier, almost simple. Desire gave me 
courage, where it had once made me speechless. With almost no thought I heard 
myself saying, 
“I want to sleep with you.” 
“I don't know if I can,” she said, still softly, touching the sunken place on her 
nightshirt where her left breast should have been. “And you don’t mind this?” 
I had wondered so often how it would feel under my hands, my lips, this 
different part of her. Mind? I felt my love spread like a shower of light 
surrounding me and this woman before me. I reached over and touched Eudora’s 
face with my hands. 
“Are you sure?” Her eyes were still on my face.  
“Yes, Eudora. [. . .] I’m very sure.” [. . .] As I spoke the words, I felt them 
touch and give life to a new reality within me, some half-known self come of age, 
moving out to meet her. (1982: 166–7) 
Audre feels her capacities grow, and raising that feeling to speech closes a chapter of 
speechlessness that had constrained her earlier life. This is self-preservation in Lorde’s dynamic 
sense, preservation of her “half-known self” made possible through speaking from the 
knowledge afforded by feeling deeply.  
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Ethicists judging this encounter under the standard rubric of valid consent will define 
Eudora’s responsibility to Audre based on whether the power differentials between them 
undermine consensuality. There might be reason to doubt the validity of Audre’s affirmation if 
the encounter is judged according to conventions governing heterosexual consent: consent across 
differentials of age, race, and experience does not align with societal norms or (some) moral 
intuitions about the distribution of power necessary to ground an equitable sexual relationship.  
Without detracting from the urgency of examining the effects of power differentials on 
sexual agency, I propose that we resist reading the ethical content of Audre’s utterance—“Yes, 
Eudora, I’m very sure”—as merely a moment of clear consent to be evaluated for validity. 
Understanding Eudora’s responsibility requires situating Audre’s “yes” within Audre’s form of 
agency, not merely evaluating whether Audre’s words validly give permission. This encounter 
should be read as Audre’s attempt to act on the knowledge that comes from a feeling—to move 
toward newly minted possibilities of self-preservation. Whether Eudora chooses to sleep with her 
or not, to acknowledge and valorize Audre’s agency here requires more than making sure Audre 
has the opportunity to say no. It requires responding to her “yes” in a way that acknowledges its 
significance—acknowledging that her expression of agency has an origin in feeling and a 
trajectory toward a new mode of relating that might expand possibilities for self-preservation. 
Eudora’s responsibility, whether in taking up the offer or turning it down, is to acknowledge 
through her response that for Audre something more is at stake—that Audre’s agency is not 
reducible to maintaining her standing in the face of differentials of power (Cf. Stewart 2017 on 
black women’s agency and sexuality). If Eudora had more direct power over Audre—if she were 
a man or young Audre’s professor—it would introduce further layers of responsibility that shape 
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how this ought to be done, but it would not diminish the importance of acknowledging the 
validity of Lorde’s agency in this way. 
In both encounters, I have suggested that Lorde’s expression of consent ought to be 
understood as calling for a response from her partner. But how much must Lorde’s partners 
know of her feelings to respond adequately to her? Are they not afflicted, like Adrienne Rich in 
the exchange opening this article, with an inability to know what Lorde knows and feels? 
Because Lorde’s feelings develop in opposition to dominant hermeneutical resources—
particularly those of the 1950s US, where these events take place—her partners certainly cannot 
take their cues from available sexual conventions. I cannot decisively resolve the question of 
whether one can access another’s feeling in the way necessary to support this kind of 
responsibility. I want to highlight, however, that other resources may be available to complicate 
the role of knowing in such an endeavor, articulating a form of knowing in the service of acting 
that Lorde’s account brings to the fore. In ‘Knowing and Acknowledging’ (2002), Cavell 
describes acknowledgment as the mode by which we can be said to “know” another person’s 
inner experience of a feeling. To know in a way that acknowledges, he explains, brings with it 
the “requirement that I do something or reveal something on the basis of that knowledge” (237). 
The second-personal statement, “I know your pain”—Cavell’s primary example—only attains its 
everyday meaning if it expresses sympathy, and it only succeeds in expressing sympathy 
because your suffering makes a claim upon me. It is not enough that I know (am 
certain) that you suffer—I must do or reveal something (whatever can be done). 
In a word, I must acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what “(your or his) 
being in pain” means. (243) 
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Because Lorde’s actions are motivated by a knowledge that comes from feeling, her partners 
cannot adequately grasp (i.e. know) the meaning of her expressions of desire or will unless they 
begin to acknowledge the feeling that those actions express. Since self-preservation for Lorde 
requires generating new possibilities for relating—what Sara Ahmed (2006) calls novel 
proximities and lines of contact—Lorde’s agential expressions of sexual interest and consent are 
calls for her partners to follow her into new modes of connection. Lorde’s actions place a claim 
on her partners, and her partners’ responses ought to acknowledge the moral validity of that 
claim as an expression of agency. 
Of course, for Audre’s actions to be acknowledged in this way requires that her affirmation 
be heard as a proposal to create something new—it requires uptake that already goes beyond 
heterosexual conventions of giving permission for sex. Here, perhaps a form of attentiveness 
akin to not looking the other way from feeling might occasion Lorde’s partners to appreciate her 
project of self-preservation and to examine what feelings participation in that project might 
produce for themselves. Perhaps not looking the other way can enable two people to grapple with 
feelings that in principle remain opaque to one another, enabling them to become intimate 
despite the lack of ground to secure against the risk of misrecognition. Crucially, however, Lorde 
ought also not to evade her own responsibility to remain attentive to the others with whom she 
pursues sexual agency. The stories not told in her writing include those where her lovers found 
her to be forceful and manipulative, and where she used her revered status in lesbian circles to 
prioritize over the agency of others her own desire for sexual connection (de Veaux 2004: 126–9, 
241). (Indeed, Audre in the first encounter above seems breezily willing to instrumentalize her 
male partner for sexual purposes.) This swirling of power and agency in Lorde’s encounters 
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points toward an ambiguity or multi-directionality of responsibility that merits further 
examination.  
In the first example, Audre’s partner refuses to respond to her in a way that admits value to 
her agency; instead, he denies the moral relevance of her feelings and will and forecloses her 
pursuit of self-preservation. He looks the other way from both the value of Audre’s self-
preservation and from his own agency to loosen the grip of harmful conventions, and he thus 
fails to fulfill his responsibility to Lorde. (He also refuses to base his action on the question of 
whether or not she consents, but this unambiguous wrong is a consequence of his refusal to 
acknowledge the moral claim posed by Audre’s agency). 
In the second case, Eudora responds to Audre’s subversion of convention by recognizing 
and responding to—acknowledging—the basis of Audre’s actions in a feeling-based agency to 
pursue self-preservation. The felicity of the encounter does not follow from a transparent match 
between how the two interpret Audre’s “yes, I’m very sure”. Rather, the lovers both face the 
inadequacy of socially available models for making sense of Audre’s utterance in this moment, 
and together they create a new shape for intimate relating. Note that the limited usefulness of 
conventions to make sense of this encounter is a failure of social norms, not a failure of 
communicative conventions that make such an agreement intelligible and recognizable as 
carrying illocutionary force. While Lorde’s utterance is clearly interpretable as a performative of 
affirmation, judging the validity of her act of consent—i.e. whether it is intentional, volitional, 
competent—depends on social norms (and moral intuitions) to interpret the situation and her 
mental state. These are the conventions Lorde confounds, because her self-preservation requires 
resisting prevailing understandings of what desire, autonomy, competence, and so forth entail—
both under heteronormative social norms that pretend to universality and under the separate 
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norms foisted onto black women, lesbians, and others who do not live along prescribed lines of 
sociality. In the face of inadequate conventions, an act of shared creation such as that between 
Audre and Eudora requires that partners not only respect each other’s refusals, but also respond 
to each other’s affirmations in ways that acknowledge and valorize the feelings and agency—in 
this case the project of self-preservation—behind those expressions of consent. 
Returning to the assumptions subtending the standard philosophical account of sexual 
consent, fruitful questions arise when we read Audre Lorde’s encounters contextually, with an 
appreciation of her account of agency. First, it seems that responsibility to a partner may be 
poorly mapped by a notion of consent-as-permission, since an expression of consent or desire 
gains its value and meaning—not only its moral validity—from the agency of the person who 
expresses it. Rather than simply give permission, consent demands a certain kind of response 
from a partner so that the value of this agential background is properly acknowledged. 
Specifically, Lorde’s partners may be obligated to respond to her consent in ways that 
acknowledge the validity of her agency to pursue self-preservation. Second, Lorde’s examples 
suggest that an act of consenting can call into question the value imbued in conventions of 
meaning and behavior; it can reveal the need for new forms of interpretation and new models for 
intimacy. Acting responsibly to a sexual partner sometimes requires recognizing that intimacy 
together might entail pushing beyond the affordances of those norms. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
I have described Audre Lorde’s account of feeling, knowing, and acting toward self-
preservation as a model for oppositional agency when a society undermines possibilities of 
knowledge and survival. With the growing philosophical interest in Lorde’s work, I hope 
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contextualizing her thought within this frame contributes to new insight into her concept of the 
erotic and her account of the role of feelings in coalition-building. I have also suggested that 
considering Lorde’s oppositional agency in this light can reveal something about how moral 
intuitions should evolve in response to nonideal social conditions, a question of central 
importance for current discussions of sexual consent. 
I have also sought to demonstrate that drawing on Lorde’s life and thought as a source of 
philosophical insight can introduce productive tensions in theoretical normative debates, perhaps 
holding them more accountable to the lives they attempt to understand and shape. For sexual 
ethics, Lorde’s work encourages us to look beyond the assumption that the norm of consent 
provides the core moral content of sexual encounters. Responsibility to a partner requires more 
than recognizing a yes as a giving of permission and a no as a refusal under prevailing 
conventions. Lorde’s agency—acting on felt knowledge toward self-preservation—teaches us 
that social norms are always invested with value, and desires and intentions must often be 
pursued in opposition to the transparency that prevailing conventions might provide. This is to 
say that a sexual “yes” is overdetermined in ways that demand further moral reflection and 
exploration. 
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